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Empirical evidence on determinants of credit constraints and the amount borrowed by urban 
household in Sub-Saharan Africa is almost non-existent. Using an extended direct 
approach by virtue of the unique data set we have (the Fourth Round Ethiopian 
Urban Household Survey), we analysed the determinants of credit constraints and the 
amount borrowed by urban households. We find a high percentage of credit-
constrained households, the majority of which constitute discouraged borrowers. 
Discrete choice models that control for potential endogeneity and selectivity bias 
have been fitted to our data. Our analysis shows  current household resources, 
number of dependants, and location as significant correlates. 
 
Keywords:  credit  constrained households; credit rationing; endogeneity; instrumental 
variables; urban Ethiopia; Africa 
 





Credit constraints are well documented in the literature. The main reasons are: 
imperfect information and adverse selection effects that are strong enough to push 
some households out of capital markets (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993; Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981; Braverman and Guasch, 1993; Aryeety and Udry, 1997); high transaction costs 
in obtaining credit, or risk rationing imposed by borrowers unwilling to lose their 
collateral (Boucher et al., 2005). 
 
Households’ credit constraints have detrimental effects on asset accumulation and 
 2poverty reduction. Credit constraints reduce the capacity to smooth consumption in 
the face of idiosyncratic and/or covariate risks (Udry, 1991; Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1990; Zeldes, 1989) and deter investment in children’s health and education (Becker 
and Tomes, 1986; Foster, 1995). Credit constraints would also reduce the availability 
of financial resources which can be used to buy inputs, finance business start ups and 
hence reduce poverty. In the specific context of Ethiopia, provision of credit for the 
poor can complement existing reform packages to pro-poor growth (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 2001; Kedir, 1999).  
 
A good understanding of the determinants of households’ access to credit is an 
integral part of poverty reduction efforts in poor countries (Mosley, 1999; Matin, et 
al., 2002; Amin et al., 2003). However, rigorous examinations have been hampered by 
the absence of household-level data that enables researchers to identify credit-
constrained households. There is also yet little information, particularly in urban areas 
on the characteristics of the households who are likely to be constrained and the 
extent of credit rationing in the formal sector.  This study is motivated by the lack of 
studies based on survey data collected from urban households in Africa that directly 
test the presence of  credit constraints
1. Most studies focus on rural credit markets in 
Asia especially in India (Pal, 2002; Kochar, 1997; Bell, et al., 1997). Empirical 
specification of households’ credit constraints is pertinent as the welfare of 
households can be better examined if those who are credit constrained can be 
identified. 
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses some 
theoretical issues of credit constraints
2 followed by the various empirical approaches 
 3of identifying credit-constrained households in section 3. Section 4 gives a description 
of the data and our definition of credit constrained households. Section 5 gives insight 
into the structure of credit markets in urban Ethiopia. Section 6 presents and discusses 
our econometric evidence.  Finally, we forward concluding remarks and highlight 
some policy implications of our results. 
 
 
2.  CREDIT CONSTRAINTS IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
 
The most influential model of the demand for household credit is the permanent/life-
cycle model of consumption (Friedman, 1957). The model assumes the presence of 
perfect capital markets. An implicit assumption of this neo-classical model is that 
institutions (economic and political) do not matter (North, 1993), even though they 
determine the structure and costs of human interaction. In developing countries, 
especially low-income countries such as Ethiopia, markets are characterised by   
institutional rigidities that deny the sustainability of the neo-classical assumptions of 
well functioning markets, perfect competition and mobility of factors of production. 
With institutions playing a critical factor in determining the performance of 
economies, it is perhaps no surprise that savings and credit have played the role of 
coping mechanisms in times of income loss and in situations where the state is too 
weak to implement effective labour market policies. After more than a decade of neo-
liberal reform with the assistance of the IMF to bring about well functioning labour 
markets, employment creation in Ethiopia was negative (De Gobbi, 2006).  
 
 Households face an environment characterized by underdeveloped capital markets, 
 4ubiquitous information asymmetry and weak mechanisms to enforce formal contracts. 
The main coping mechanism for poor households is informal networks, which act as 
risk sharing mechanisms (Cox and Fafchamps, 2007). Households are more likely to 
receive gifts from close relatives such as parents, spouses children and loans from 
more distant relatives (in-laws, uncles and aunts). Krishnan and Sciubba (2004) 
highlight the significant role played by extended family and kinship relationships in 
pooling labor in Rural Ethiopia.   
 
 A number of studies have analyzed the issue of credit constraints at the household 
level and its impact on welfare outcomes such as income, consumption, nutrition and 
agricultural productivity (Diagne, 1999). This study focuses on determining which 
types of households have encountered difficulties in obtaining credit and their 
characteristics as well as the determinants of the likelihood of being rationed out of 
the credit market and the volume of loan accessed by households. This can be a useful 
guide to policy makers as to where targeting is needed to remove constraints. In other 
words, determining which households are credit constrained could increase the 
effectiveness of credit programs for the poor (Barham et al., 1996; Carter and Olinto, 
2003). 
 
3. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO IDENTIFY CREDIT-CONSTRAINED 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Empirical studies aiming to identify credit constrained households are based on two 
major approaches. Most of the studies follow an indirect approach based on the 
sensitivity of current consumption to transitory income as indicated in the life 
 5cycle/permanent income hypothesis (Hall, 1978; Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Hayashi, 
1985; Zeldes, 1989; Diagne et al, 2000). It is assumed that, with standard convex 
preferences, and in the absence of liquidity and borrowing constraints, transitory 
income shocks should not affect consumption (Diagne et al., 2000; Zeldes, 1989). 
These indirect tests could result in imprecise estimates of the effects of credit 
constraints.  Also, uncertainty can induce precautionary behavior and a dependence of 
consumption on transitory income even in the absence of credit constraints.   
 
The second approach is a direct one, which exploits information about the status of 
loan applications of households (see Feder et al., 1989; and Jappelli, 1990). Feder et 
al’s survey of China asks households whether at the going interest rate they would 
have liked to borrow more institutional credit
3 than they were granted. Non-
borrowing households were asked about their reason for not borrowing.  If it was not 
due to sufficient credit, but due to inability to obtain credit, then this group was 
classified as constrained
4. This method was also used by Barham et al (1996). 
Households were asked whether they have applied for credit; if so, whether their 
application was rejected; and if it was approved, whether they have obtained the full 
amount that they requested. Feder et al. (1989) found that defining credit-constrained 
households this way was compatible with data on the overall liquidity of the 
households.  However, using this method of determining whether households are 
credit-constrained also requires collecting information on households that did not 
apply for credit. This point is analogous to the argument for including discouraged 
workers in unemployment statistics. 
 
 6Jappelli (1990) identifies credit constrained consumers as those who had their request 
for credit rejected by financial institutions. A household will be credit constrained if: 
D r A Y C > + − − ) 1 (
*       ( 1 )  
where   is optimal consumption, Y (income) and 
* C A (nonhuman wealth) are the 
resources available to each consumer, r  is the real interest rate and   is the amount 
that the consumer can borrow. 
D
  
As can be seen from Equation (1), both supply side and demand side factors are at 
play and will jointly determine whether the consumer is credit constrained: on the left 
hand side the difference between his optimal consumption and his overall wealth and 
on the right hand side the number of financial institutions (formal and informal) that 
can provide credit. 
 
Jappelli (1990) also identifies households who are discouraged from taking a loan as 
credit constrained.  The discouraged are those who answered “yes” to the question: 
“Was there any time in the past few years that you (or your husband/wife) thought of 
applying for credit at a particular place but changed your mind because you thought 
you might be turned down?” In general terms, and after considering both demand and 
supply factors, a household will be credit constrained if its demand for credit is higher 
than the available credit supply. Some of the variables that will determine the extent 
of the binding constraint are: (i) households’ current resources, (ii) proxies for future 
income, (iii) demographic characteristics and (iv) proxies for past credit history and 
 7institutional constraints. 
 
Based on surveys conducted in Malawi and Bangladesh, Diagne (1999) and Diagne 
(et al., 2000) argue that the direct approach that classifies households into discrete 
groups  fails to measure the extent of the credit constraints faced by households. This 
line of research stresses the importance of the data collection methodology that 
identifies a credit limit variable – the maximum that the lender is willing to lend. This 
limit is not the maximum the lender is able to lend to any borrower. The borrower is 




Other tests of credit constraints have been conducted in the context of the analysis of 
consumption. Since the theory of the optimization of consumption over time says that 
household consumption is constrained only by its lifetime budget constraint, if true, 
this means that households’ propensity to increase consumption is less if they receive 
a temporary increase in income than if they receive a permanent increase in income. 
However, empirical studies have shown that consumption is more sensitive to 
temporary income changes than this theory would suggest, perhaps because 
households suffer from credit constraints.  
 
Zeldes (1989) explicitly used Euler equations (as first done by Hall 1978) to test the 
hypothesis that households maximize their lifetime utility subject to credit constraints. 
He proceeds by specifying a model and split the sampled households in advance into 
two groups, one of which (with low or negative wealth) is being credit constrained. 
 8However, some authors have argued that if households are credit-constrained, they 
may change their consumption without violating the Euler equations, thus weakening 
the usefulness of such tests (Deaton, 1992).  
 
This paper follows a direct approach to identify credit-constrained households in 
urban Ethiopia. We extend the definition of credit constrained households adopted by 
Jappelli (1990) by taking into account households who have applied for loan but 
received an amount which is less than what they have applied for. Our extended 
definition allows us to provide a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints 
which includes self-imposed rationing resulting from high default risk. After 
establishing the extent of rationing in the formal sector, we examine the 
characteristics of the households who are likely to be constrained and identify the 
factors that affect the probability of being credit constrained and the volume of loan 
amount demanded by households. The results of our paper would contribute to the 
existing survey-based quantitative and direct evidence on households’ access to credit 
in developing countries.   
 
4. DATA AND AN EXTENDED DEFINITION OF CREDIT-CONSTRAINED 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
The analysis in this study is based on the fourth round socio-economic survey of 
urban households in Ethiopia (EUHS, 2000) which has been collected by the 
Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University in collaboration with the 
Department of Economics of the University of Goteborg, Sweden. The survey 
questionnaire was designed to capture the major socio-economic characteristics of 
 9urban households. It included modules on household demographics including 
education, credit, rural-urban migration, employment and income, consumption, 
ownership of durables, housing, health, welfare and welfare change indicators.   
 
A sample of 1500 households was selected from seven major urban centres of the 
country. The total sample size was distributed over the selected urban centres 
proportional to their populations, based on the CSA’s (Central Statistical Authority) 
1992 projections. Accordingly, the sample included 900 households in Addis Ababa 
(the capital city), 125 in Dire Dawa, 75 in Awassa, and 100 in each of the other four 
towns. 
 
Due to a unique nature of our survey information, we identified three categories of 
credit constrained households. The first category of constrained households is defined 
as those households that report a positive response to the following question: “During 
the last 12 months, did any member of your household apply for a loan and was the 
loan completely rejected?”  In addition, our data consists of information on two more 
other categories of households. The first category of households consists of 
households that have applied for a loan and who reported less than 100 percent as the 
loan percentage approved. These households are credit-constrained because they 
applied for a loan but got a loan amount less than the amount they applied for. The 
third category of constrained households is what we classify as ‘discouraged 
borrowers’. Our data asks households to supply their reasons if they failed to apply 
for a loan in the last 12 months. For instance, households have cited many reasons 
such as ‘we will not have any chance of success’, ‘loan application takes long time to 
process’, and ‘high interest rate’. In the present application, we included those 
 10households that give the above reasons among credit-constrained households.  Our 
extended direct approach enabled us to provide a more complete definition of credit 
constrained households unlike previous studies (Diagne et al., 2000; Jappelli, 1990). 
In the next section, we discuss some of the characteristics of credit markets in urban 
areas in Ethiopia. 
 
5. MAIN FEATURES OF THE CREDIT MARKET IN URBAN ETHIOPIA 
 
This section explores the structure of credit markets in urban Ethiopia in detail.  One 
of the main observable features of credit markets in developing countries is the 
presence of segmented and well-defined formal and informal financial institutions 
(Aryeetey and Udry, 1997; Bell, 1993; Basu, 1983). The formal sector consists of 
commercial banks while the informal sector includes microfinance institutions
6, 
indigenous credit sources such as landlords, rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs), money lenders, trade creditors and family and friends.  
 
 The degree to which these sectors are affected by adverse selection, moral hazard and 
enforcement problem determines the nature of the transactions between lenders and 
potential borrowers. The discussion below highlights the main feature of the urban 
credit market in Ethiopia.   
 
Sources of loans   
 
The information on sources of loans reveals the importance of the informal sector. 
According to table 1 below, 79% of the 315 households obtained their loan from the 
 11informal and semi-formal sectors while 21% of loans were obtained from the formal 
sector.  The most predominant source within the informal sector is ‘friends and 
relatives’ (75%).  Not a great proportion of loans originate from group schemes such 
as ROSCAs. This is not surprising because Ethiopian ROSCAs are primarily formed 
as vehicles of saving mobilization rather than credit institutions.  It is interesting to 
note that there are few loans obtained from moneylenders who are dominant lenders 
elsewhere such as India and Thailand (Bell, 1993).  In the formal sector, the 
microfinance institutions play the dominant role in lending (45%) while banks and the 
government provide very few loans.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Duration of loans 
 
Almost half of the households that reported taking out loans did not report the due 
date of their loans. For those we observe valid responses, most of the loans are short-
term loans. For instance, 96 percent of the loans have to be repaid within one year. A 
further examination of the data reveals that most of the short-term loans have 
originated from informal lender. Therefore, there is a strong link between the source 
and duration of the loan – a link that might extend to the purpose for which the loan 
amount is used.  
 
Who has a preferential access to different sources of loans? 
 
We investigated whether households headed by males and females have differential 
 12access to various sources of loans. According to table 2 below, on the aggregate, both 
types of households have almost equal access to credit; the number of male headed 
households that accessed loans being slightly less than that of female-headed 
households. 55 percent of the individuals who accessed formal loans are females as 
opposed to 51 percent in the case of informal loans. While friends and relatives give 
more loans to males, institutions such as micro-finance institutions give more loans to 
females. The high participation by women in informal networks is consistent with 
other studies in Africa, which show that women, especially married women use 
informal networks to protect their earnings against claims by their husbands (Hogset, 
2005). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Lending and borrowing behavior 
 
There are very few households that have a bank account (only 16% of them), 
indicating little use of formal institutions for borrowing and/or saving purposes. This 
is interesting, given that our survey information is collected from the seven major 
urban areas in Ethiopia. This indicates the acute lack of financial depth even in the 
major urban centers of the country.  
 
Uses of loans from each source 
 
Households took loans both for consumption
7 and productive purposes. The two 
major reasons for taking out a loan related to food purchases (28.5%) and expansion/ 
 13setting up businesses (27.6%). Other important reasons include payment of utilities 
and related expenses (13.8%), financing health, education and transport expenses 
(13.4%) and purchase of consumer durables (11.0%). Very few households took out a 
loan to build a house (5.7%). Unlike the findings for rural credit markets, 
consumption finance is the main reason for borrowing in urban Ethiopia (Gill and 
Singh, 1997; Swaminathan, 1991; Timberg and Aiyar, 1984).  
 
In an attempt to uncover whether there is any systematic relationship between purpose 
and source of loans, we found that friends and relatives provide loans practically for 
all purposes. This confirms the fact that informal agencies ensure a lower probability 
of default given a better knowledge of their clients and do not suffer from severe 
adverse selection, moral hazard and enforcement problems as formal credit 
institutions (Basu, 1983). After friends and relatives however, credit associations and 
microfinance institutions are the next largest lenders, and tend to lend for various 
purposes.  
 
However, formal sources such as banks do not fund consumption but provide loans 
for business start ups/expansion suggesting a certain degree of segmentation. This 
indicates quite a high degree of exclusiveness of loans from the various sectors which 
results from asymmetric information limiting the extent to which formal lenders can 
monitor borrower activities, hence excluding borrowers from formal sector loans 





 14Apart from the interest rates charged, there are no data on any other conditions 
imposed on loans by lenders such as interlinkages of contracts with other markets.  
The minimum rate was 0% while the maximum was 20%, with 33% of loans being 
interest free.  The presence of extreme variability in the interest rate charged by 
lenders within an economy is one of the salient features of credit markets in 
developing countries (Banerjee, 2001; Fafchamps, 2000). The mean interest rate is 
only 3.1%. We argue that this is not due to the fact that a proportion of the population 
surveyed is significantly Islamic
9 because Muslims constitute only 13.3% of all the 
households interviewed. Hence the underlying reason for low use of interest rates 
could be explained if we link interest rates with sources of loan. As expected, friends 
and relatives lend without requiring interest payments. In addition, employers, credit 
associations and even NGO/Government too give a small number of interest free 
loans. Therefore, not all formal sector loans are interest bearing and not all of the 
loans obtained from friends and relations are interest free. For instance, micro-finance 
institutions, banks and credit associations tend to charge interest across the whole 
range of rates while there is one case of friends or relatives charging the highest rate 
of 20%.  Most of the rates provided by micro-finance institutions are small which is 
consistent with the rates common in group lending schemes. The nature of interest 
rates seems to indicate that credit markets in urban Ethiopia are likely to be 
characterized by low interest rates as far as the informal lenders go, however the 
consideration of default risk by these lenders is not altogether absent (Basu, 1983). 
This is in sharp contrast to the extensive literature on dominance of exploitative 
informal moneylenders in credit markets of less developed economies. Our finding 
does not also support the rationing hypothesis which is based on the assumption that 
formal credit is the cheapest credit available (Pal, 2002; Bell et al., 1997)  
 15 
Loan amount and Household Characteristics  
 
Households are asked to report the loan amount they borrowed both in cash and in 
kind. The loan component reported in-kind has been converted into cash equivalents 
during the interview. The average annual loan amount of all households is 223 birr
10 
with a maximum of 50,000 birr.  The majority of households borrowed an amount less 
than 10,000 birr. To investigate some interesting relationships, we linked the loan 
amount borrowed with household characteristics. Table 3 shows summary statistics of 
total loan amount by household characteristics.   There seems to be little gender bias 
again, as females receive only slightly less of the mean total loan amount (213 birr) 
than males (230 birr).  Total loan is found to be increasing in household size, but for 
very large households, this loan amount falls.  For the ethnic groups Gurage and 
especially Tigre, there appears to be a significantly larger mean of the total loan 
granted as compared to the other ethnic groups. Household with Protestant heads also 
received higher mean loan amount than other households. 
 




Credit-constrained households in this study are defined according to the details given 
in section 3 above. Table 4 gives the number of constrained households. 293 
households have applied for a loan and supplied their reasons for borrowing. 17 of 
these households have failed to report the status of their application. Therefore, they 
 16are excluded from the sample. Out of the original sample, 1179 did not apply for a 
loan and reported various factors that deter them from applying. The results show the 
presence of a high percentage of credit-constrained households in urban Ethiopia 
(26.6%).  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
It is evident that the discouraged constitute the highest proportion of the credit-
constrained households. This is not surprising because the banking sector in Ethiopia 
is dominated by bureaucratisation and buck-passing (Banerjee and Duflo, 2001). The 
two major reasons for discouragement are households’ perception of the success 
probability of their loan application and lack of collateral. For instance, 47.9% of the 
discouraged borrowers did not apply because they believed they would not be 
successful while 32.8% of them did not apply because they did not have collateral.  
The interest rate (13%) and loan processing time (5.42%) were also mentioned as 
deterrents to applying.  
 
6. ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE 
 
In this section, we present the results from various discrete choice and discrete-
continuous models. The first one is a conventional probit model to predict the 
probability of being credit constrained (say P). However, one important empirical 
issue is the potential endogeneity of the household expenditure variable which is 
entered as a right hand side variable in the probit model predicting the probability of 
credit constrained. Therefore, we carried out maximum likelihood estimation of 
Amemiya’s GLS (generalized least squares) estimator which is sometimes referred to 
 17as IV (instrumental variables) probit estimation to control for the endogeneity 
associated with the household expenditure variable (see Newey, 1987). Our 
instrument is the income variable which is strongly correlated with the potential 
endogenous expenditure variable
11. Finally, in order to study the determinants of the 
loan amount demanded/received by households respectively we estimated two 
additional models: a tobit and a instrumental variables tobit model.  
 
The empirical modeling of the determinants of access to credit or probability of credit 
constraint can be handled by estimating a probit model due to the binary nature of the 




i i i x y μ β + = '
* .       ( 2 )  
In practice, we do not observe   but a dummy dependent variable y which takes a 
value of either 0 or 1. In the present context, a value of 1 is assigned to credit-
constrained households and zero otherwise.   represents a vector of household 




i μ  is the error term which is normally distributed with zero 
mean and constant variance. In the IV probit context, equation (2) can be specified as  
 
i ei i i x y y μ β γ + + =
' * '       ( 3 )  
 
Where   is the variable that is potentially endogenous (i.e. total household 
expenditure) – the variable we suspect to have a non-zero correlation with the error 
term;   our exogenous variables, 
i y
ei x γ and β  are vector of parameters to be estimated.  
 
 18Our independent variables (x) are grouped into four groups:  (i) proxies for current 
resources such as total household expenditure and the value of household assets, (ii) 
proxies for expected future income such as years of schooling, (iii) demographic 
variables and (iv) regional variables and squared and interaction terms. It is 
important to note that these variables can reflect both determinants of demand for 
credit and determinants of supply of credit.  Hence in some cases the effects of the 
independent variables on the probability of being credit constrained may be a priori 
ambiguous as demand and supply factors may be working in the same direction. The 
conventional probit model estimates and the instrumental variables probit estimates 
are presented in Table 5.  
 
The most striking feature of our empirical results is that, as in Jappelli (1990), richer 
households (broadly measured by a household’s level of expenditure) have a lower 
probability of being rationed out of the credit market. The presence of both a 
significant positive effect of the level of expenditure and a negative coefficient in the 
quadratic term indicate the presence of non-linear effects on the probability of being 
credit constrained. While at lower levels of expenditure (proxy for income) the 
probability of being constrained increases (as the household increases its consumption 
and its demand for credit) richer households are, as expected, less likely to be credit 
constrained. 
  
While the coefficient of the value of households’ assets has the expected negative sign 
and is significant at the 5% level, its impact on the probability of being credit 
constrained is rather small (close to zero).  Expected future income, measured by the 
number of years of schooling has also a negative but insignificant effect on the 
 19probability of being credit constrained.  The negative coefficient on education could 
have suggested that it is supply side (rather than demand) considerations that act to 
relax the credit constraint. These results indicate that lenders use both current and 
future expected income as important criteria for judging creditworthiness of a 
borrower.  
 
To further investigate this issue we now focus on the impact of the squared and 
interaction terms for expenditure, wealth and some demographic variables. The results 
indicate that households with dependent children between the age of 6 and 15 and that 
live in the capital city and Bahar Dar, Dessie, Dire and Jimma are more likely to be 
credit constrained. The presence of more dependants in a given household may 
discourage lenders from lending because it has direct implication in terms of earning 
capacity, as well as causing higher desired consumption by borrowers thereby 
tightening the credit constraint. Household size, age and its square term do not feature 
as significant determinants of P. However, these are household characteristics that 
other studies have found to be highly significant (e.g. Zeller, 1994). Marital status and 
gender dummies were also found to be insignificant, the latter implying no gender 
bias and confirming our findings in the previous section. Location matters in 
accessing loanable funds in urban Ethiopia. Relative to Mekele, households in Addis 
Ababa, Bahar Dar, Dessie, Dire and Jimma are more likely to be credit constrained 
suggesting the presence of regional variations in the ways credit markets function in 
the country.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 20In this study, we also investigated the factors affecting the volume of loan accessed by 
households. To allow for the censored nature of the dependent variable, we have 
estimated a tobit model assuming a correlation between the unobservables affecting 
households decision to borrow with their decision on how much to borrow. Since the 
model of determinants of the volume of loan amount can be perceived as a model of 
credit demand, it is not reasonable to exclude households with zero loan amounts. The 
tobit model handles the potential selectivity bias that arises due to the non-random 
choice of borrowing households.  In addition, both the tobit and the IV tobit models 
are chosen over other possible two-stage estimations techniques (e.g. Heckman two-
stage selection model) due to a lack of any theoretical guide as to the choice of 
appropriate identifying restrictions at the second stage of the estimation.  
 
















      ( 4 )  
 
        (5)  i i i ei i i z x y y μ δ μ γ β + = + + =
*
 
Where  denotes the dependent variable (i.e. loan amount),   is the variable that is 
potentially endogenous (i.e. total household expenditure), and the rest of the variables 
are as defined earlier. The estimated parameters of both standard tobit and IV tobit 
models (i.e. marginal effects) are reported in table 6.  
*
i y i y
 
 21While it can be of use to analyze the determinants of loan amount from the borrower’s 
perspective, thereby reflecting behavior on the demand side of the credit market, the 
variables collected here are those determinants likely to be used from the lender’s 
perspective to screen borrowers. Given this, the econometric analysis allows us to see 
the extent of rationing that occurs once the lender has decided to lend.   
 
The explanatory variables in the tobit model represent determinants of rationing 
mostly on the supply side of the market.  The expected signs differ this time, for 
example, total loan amount is likely to be increasing in current income/expenditure. 
While demand side influences may be simultaneously at play, their relative 
importance as compared to supply side influences would depend on the relative 
bargaining power of borrowers and lenders.  However, the main influence on the total 
loan amount granted is likely to be the degree to which the lender expects the 
borrower to repay/default. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
From table 6, it is evident that current resources (measured by both household 
expenditure and the interaction term expenditure*assets), the value of collateral, and 
the presence of number of children aged between 6 and 15 are significant positive 
factors in affecting the volume of loan households received. The positive effect of 
households’ welfare position on the size of the loan is corroborated by evidence for 
India (Gill and Singh, 1997). The estimation also reveals a significant quadratic 
relationship between the age of the head and the volume of loan. 
 
 22Except for the sign of the negative value of the assets coefficients, our results are 
consistent with our a priori theoretical expectation about the loan amount supplied by 
lenders. Also, due to the simultaneity of demand and supply factors, the marginally 
significant negative marital status dummy can be an indication of the financial 
stability of the household and its accompanied declining demand for loans.  
 
The results reveal an absence of gender, ethnic and religious discrimination in loan 
allocations. However, the negative “non-addis” coefficient suggests the presence of 
discrimination in the volume of loan amounts received, in favor of the capital city. 
This highlights the importance of credit as an integral part of any effective poverty 
reduction strategy, which aims to combat uneven development in Ethiopia. As pointed 
out in the  recent activities related to Ethiopia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – 
the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP)- credit 
schemes that target the elderly in the capital city proved to be successful in reducing 
old age poverty (Baleher and Yirsaw, 2003). Therefore, the provision of similar 
schemes to other households in other regions can be an effective poverty reduction 




Our analysis reveals that credit markets are slightly segmented and that the informal 
sector is not only the major source of loans in rural areas in Ethiopia as shown by 
Krishnan and Sciubba (2004), but also dominates the urban areas. Most of the credit 
constrained households are the discouraged. Hence the removal of barriers by 
restructuring the banking sector via reduced bureaucracy and transaction costs should 
be a promising route to enable households access credit. Another interesting feature is 
 23the absence of gender, ethnic and religious discrimination in loan allocations. The 
significance of current household resources both in affecting credit access and the 
volume of loan borrowed provides justification for government’s targeting of 
economic exclusion.. The excluded have been identified in this paper as the poor, 
uneducated and households with children.  
 
Informal and semi-formal sectors provide a large proportion of loans. By exploiting 
existing strong social ties policy targets may focus on financial linkages between 
formal and informal sectors to enhance access to credit. Micro-finance institutions 
have been shown to be reaching vulnerable/relatively poorer groups such as women.  
However, as long as formal and informal institutions keep apart, far reaching 
developmental processes are unlikely to happen. Traditional financial systems in 
Africa usually undertake minimum intermediation and often specialize in either 
deposit-taking or lending. Therefore, an integral aspect of targeted intervention should 
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Table 1: Source of Loans 
 






Credit Association  40 (12.7) 
 






Other informal (e.g. ROSCAs ) 
 
5 (1.6) 






























Table 2: Distribution of the number of males and females head of households by source of loan 
 
Source of loan   Male   Female  Total  
 







Friends/relative 40  37  77 
Credit/association 9 14  23 
Employer 2  2  4 
Other informal   2  2  4 
Banks 1  2  3 
Government/NGOs 2  2  4 
Micro-finance institutions   4  9  13 
Other formal 
 
6 3  9 
Total 
 
69 (48.25%)  74 (51.75%)  143 
Source: Own-calculation from EUHS, 2000 
 
Table 3: Total Loan Amount by Household Characteristics 
 
Characteristics   Mean   Frequency (%) 
Gender  
Male   230.25      832 
Female   213.54      591 
Household size 
1 to 5  160.85  667 
6 to 10   270.56  683 
Greater than 10  191.87  73 
Ethnic groups  
Amhara 197.37      732 
Oromo 136.97      258 
Gurage 265.62      162 
Tigre   386.72      157 
Religion 
Orthodox   213.04      1147 
Catholic   66.92      13 
Protestant   311.54      52 
Muslim   220.89      180 
Location  
Addis Ababa   99.28      445 
Non- Addis Ababa  32.03      328 
Source: Own-calculation from EUHS, 2000 
 
 31Table 4: Constrained Households 
Type of households   Number (%) 
Discouraged households  332 (22.8) 
Households with rejected applications   15 (1.0) 
Households that received a loan amount less than the 
amount they applied for 
41 (2.8) 
Households with successful loan applications   220 (15.1) 
Total   1455 (100) 
Table 5: Probit models predicting the probability of being credit constrained 
Models  Probit model  Instrumental Variables 
Probit Model 
Variable   Marginal Effects  
(|t-value|) 
Marginal Effects  
(|z-value|) 
Expenditure  0.262** (2.35)  4.987 (1.56) 
Expenditure squared  -0.025*** (2.90)  -0.351** (1.70) 
Assets  -0.000** (2.27)  -0.000*** (2.95) 
Assets squared  -0.000 (0.64)  -0.000 (1.51) 
Expenditure*Assets 0.000**  (2.07) 0.000***  (2.52) 
Years of schooling   -0.003 (0.43)  -0.027 (1.07) 
Age   0.002 (0.34)  0.135 (1.32) 
Age squared  0.000 (0.27)  0.000 (0.10) 
Age*Expenditure  -0.001 (0.66)  -0.022 (1.38) 
Household size  -0.003 (0.48)  0.007 (0.27) 
Children under 6  0.010 (0.52)  -0.009 (0.14) 
Children between 6 and 15  0.020* (1.78)  0.032 (0.67) 
Adults between 16 and 54  -0.003 (0.29)  -0.024 (0.029) 
Married   0.020 (0.64)  0.026 (0.25) 
Female   -0.018 (0.60)  -0.105 (1.07) 
Addis   0.268*** (3.65)  0.843*** (2.42) 
Awassa   0.170 (1.26)  0.508 (1.58) 
Bahar Dar  0.381*** (3.07)  0.961*** (2.74) 
Dessie   0.425*** (3.53)  1.078*** (3.00) 
Dire   0.391*** (3.25)  1.180*** (4.04) 
Jimma   0.272*** (2.12)  0.715** (2.21) 
Number of observations   1384  1384 
LR chi (21) 
2 80.28  
Prob> chi  
2 0.0000  
Wald test of exogeneity: chi (1) 
2  1.06 
Prob> chi  
2  0.30 




Prob> chi  
2  0.31 
N.B.:  (i) Variables ‘Adults above 55’ and ‘Mekele’ are omitted demographic and location variables to ensure 
identification. (ii) *=Significant at the 10% level;**= Significant at the 5% level; and ***= Significant at the 1% 
level. (iii) In the Instrumental Variables specification the income variable is used to instrument for expenditure. 
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Table 6: Tobit models of loan amount received by households 
 
Models  Tobit model  Instrumental Variables 
Tobit Model 







Expenditure squared  -105.65 (1.09)  356.85 (0.36) 
Assets  -0.90*** (4.25)  -0.72* (1.67) 
Assets squared   -0.00*** (1.97)  -0.00 (0.37) 
Expenditure*Assets  0.12*** (4.04)  0.09 (1.13) 
Years of schooling   -0.20 (0.00)  27.14 (0.32) 
Household size  -111.66*** (1.91)  -141.54 (1.62) 
Collateral  0.68*** (12.63)  0.70*** (10.68) 
Age   18.56 (0.31)  -190.58 (0.43) 
Age  
2 0.60* (1.93)  0.62* (1.92) 
Age*Expenditure  -13.31 (1.59)  20.13 (0.28) 
Children under 6  133.19 (0.83)  204.53 (0.92) 
Children between 6 and 15  260.46*** (2.75)  301.30*** (2.32) 
Adults between 16 and 54  116.27 (1.55)  150.70 (1.42) 
Married   -401.00 (1.52)  -355.04 (1.23) 
Female   116.27 (0.45)  204.52 (0.63) 
Non-Addis   -350.58* (1.63)  -522.12 (1.23) 
LR chi (17) 
2 184.78  
Prob> chi  
2 0.00  
Wald test of exogeneity: chi (1) 
2  0.22 
Prob> chi  
2  0.63 





Prob> chi  
2  0.25 
N.B.: (i) Variables ‘Adults above 55’ and ‘Mekele’ are omitted demographic and location variables to ensure 
identification. (ii) *=Significant at the 10% level;**= Significant at the 5% level; and ***= Significant at the 1% 




                                                           
1 There are some studies that have investigated firm-level credit constraints in Africa (Fafchamps, 2000; Bigsten et al, 2003). 
2 For a detailed discussion of credit rationing and other relevant theoretical literature on households’ access to credit, the reader 
can refer to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Hoff and Stiglitz (1993). 
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3 In this study, the share of formal credit in total volume of new credit is 66.5% during the study period.  The bulk of credit 
granted that was not easily monitored/fungible was found to be from the formal sector (87%). 
4 Feder et al. thus drop the crucial assumption made in previous studies in the literature, of homogenous credit demand and 
supply situations for borrowers and non-borrowers.  The reason is that often non-borrowers do not borrow, not because they are 
not credit-worthy or cannot obtain credit, but because they have sufficient liquidity of their own. Furthermore, the liquidity 
position of unconstrained households as compared to constrained households is found to be much higher. This implies that 
surplus cash incomes for some households do exist. The reasonable assumption made, therefore, is that households should be 
analyzed in terms of whether they are credit-constrained or not. 
5 There are downsides to this approach too, as the authors point out.  The credit limit variable will not be totally accurate until all 
potential borrowers apply.  Heteroskedasticity would also arise since individuals who are nearer their credit limit are more able to 
accurately predict their limit than those who are further away from their limits. 
6 Although microfinance institutions (MFIs) are generally classified as informal, some of them are classified as ‘hybrids’ as they 
provide banking services as well (Akoten et al., 2006). 
7 Consumption credit enables risk pooling among risk-averse households across time in an attempt to smooth consumption under 
uncertain income streams and thus plays the role of insurance (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). 
8 In another paper, we are investigating the link between interest rates and credit demand in a similar framework advanced by 
Gross and Souleles (2002). 
9 Udry (1991) shows this is a main feature of the workings of informal credit institutions in a Nigerian village. 
10 Note that this average is computed by including households with zero loan amount. The birr is the Ethiopian currency; for 
instance, £1=13.20 birr or 1USD=8.50 birr. 
11 In each case we report the tests for the validity of our instrument (Exogeneity test of the expenditure variable): Smith and 
Blundell (1986) and Wald tests of exogeneity. 
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